Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.: A Mechanistic Application of Section 16(b) by Murrey, Dudley W.
SMU Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 4 Article 10
1972
Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.: A
Mechanistic Application of Section 16(b)
Dudley W. Murrey
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dudley W. Murrey, Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.: A Mechanistic Application of Section 16(b), 26 Sw L.J. 792 (1972)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol26/iss4/10
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
operative trust in future cases, or eventually confront the validity of the testa-
mentary trust doctrine itself. In spite of this backdoor approach, the Wester-
feld decision is pragmatically sound. Most authorities in the probate field
agree that substantial changes are necessary in present probate systems. Until
such changes occur, revocable inter vivos trusts of the Westerfeld variety may
well be a necessary alternative to the executing and probating of a will.
Susan Crump
Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.:
A Mechanistic Application of Section 16(b)
Emerson Electric Company purchased 13.2 percent of Dodge Manufacturing
Company common stock with the intent to gain control of Dodge. Subse-
quently, Dodge stockholders approved a merger with Reliance Electric Com-
pany, thereby insuring failure of the attempted takeover. To avoid the forced
exchange of Dodge stock for Reliance stock, Emerson followed a plan de-
signed to minimize the liability for short-swing profits which is imposed by
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 In the first sale Emer-
son sold 3.24 percent of the Dodge stock, thereby lowering its holdings to
9.96 percent of the outstanding Dodge stock. In a second sale two weeks
later, Emerson divested itself of the remainder of its Dodge holdings. Reliance
demanded the profits from both sales, and Emerson brought suit for a declara-
tory judgment that it had no liability for the profits under section 16(b). The
district court found Emerson liable as a statutory insider for the profits realized
on both sales.' The court of appeals reversed the lower court with respect to
Emerson's status as an insider and the liability for the profits on the second
sale.' Held, affirmed: Since section 16(b) defines "insider" as the beneficial
owner of more than ten percent of the class "both at the time of the purchase
and sale," structuring the sales to destroy insider status and thereby avoid
section 16(b) liability on the second sale is within the contemplation of the
statute. Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
I. TRENDS OF APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 16(b)
To prevent the speculative abuse of inside information, section 16(b)4
'15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970); see note 4 infra.
'Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 306 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
'Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970).
S15 U.S.C. 5 78p(b) (1970) reads in part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner ... by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any
sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . . within any period
of less than six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner . . . . This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such bene-
ficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the
sale and purchase, of the security involved . ...
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allows for recovery of short-swing profits taken by certain classes of stock-
holders through a purchase and sale within a period of six months. Among
those are shareholders who own more than ten percent of any class of equity
security of a corporation.! When ownership exceeds ten percent of the out-
standing stock, it is presumed that the shareholder has access to inside in-
formation which may be used in speculative trading.6 Consequently, to prevent
the unfair use of such information, any profits realized by the beneficial owners
in transactions within the six-month period are recoverable by the issuer of
the securities, regardless of the intent of the owner."
The enforcement of section 16(b) has been complicated by a profusion of
judicial interpretations of the congressional intent in the passage of the section.
Some courts have relied upon the statement that section 16(b) presented "a
crude rule of thumb" formulated to avoid subjective factors which present
problems of proof.! Also drawn upon are the reports of the Senate committee,
which state that the purpose of the bill is the prevention of speculative abuse
of inside information." The preamble to section 16(b) simply restates this
purpose.1' Two predominant interpretations as to the application of section
'The term "beneficial owner" is connotative of more than the simple ownership of the
stocks themselves. For a full discussion of the term "ownership" within the context of §
16(b), see Feldman & Teberg, Beneficial Ownership Under Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 W. RESERVE L. REv. 1054 (1966); Shreve, Beneficial Ownership
of Securities Held By Family Members, 22 Bus. LAW. 431 (1967).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970); see Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 356
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
'Necessary to the enforcement of § 16(b) is § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
This section introduces a reporting requirement which directs beneficial owners of more
than 10% of the stock to report their attainment of such a status. Thereafter any change
in status must be reflected by a monthly report. If there is a sale which drops the holdings
of the insider to below 10%, that must be reported. Thereafter any transactions are outside
the statute's regulation and require no report. See Form 4, SEC Securities Exchange Release
No. 6487 (Mar. 9, 1961), for particulars of the reporting requirement.8 See, e.g., Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967);
Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d
840 (2d Cir. 1959); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943).
' This statement was made by Thomas Corcoran, a drafter and primary advocate of 5
16(b). S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6556, 6557 (1934). The 'crude rule of
thumb" has been taken to endorse an automatic application of § 16(b) where the criteria
of the statute are met by the transaction in question. This imposition of strict liability is
done with a thoroughgoing indiscrimination which contemplates "the statute to be broadly
remedial ... and intended ... to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict
between the selfish interest of a ... stockholder and the faithful performance of his fidu-
ciary duty." Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cit. 1943). There is to
be no consideration of judicial exemptions of any transaction in this view of the legislative
policy. Instead, this is considered a flat prophylactic rule. To achieve the prophylactic effect
the statute is applied as a "crude rule of thumb," taking in all transactions and making
shareholders under the rule strictly liable. Through the avoidance of problems of proof
raised by consideration of intent and other subjective factors, it was hoped that an easy
and broad application of § 16(b) would be achieved with a concomitant increase in the
deterrent force of the statute.
'OS. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. NO. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 68 (1934). The Senate Committee's reports state that § 16(b) is to "protect the inter-
est of the public against the predatory operations of ...principal stockholders by preventing
them from speculating in the stock of the corporations to which they owe a fiduciary duty"
and to "protect .. . by preventing principal stockholders from speculating in stock on the
basis of information not available to others." S. REP. No. 1455, at 68; S. REP. No. 792,
at 9.
"iThe preamble states the purpose as "preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his rela-
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16(b) have developed. The first of these has been styled by the courts and
commentators as the objective approach, while the other is termed the sub-
jective approach.12
The Objective Approach. The objective approach was first used in Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp.'3 and Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte.'4 In Smolowe the court
was asked to decide whether there should be liability where there was no un-
fair use of inside information. The court found "that the only remedy which
16(b)'s framers deemed effective .. . was the imposition of a liability based
on an objective measure of proof.'"" Under this viewpoint, automatic appli-
cation of section 16(b) would allow no consideration of whether there was
actual or possible use of inside information. It was thought that to allow such
consideration would render useless those provisions of the statute that allow
the courts to avoid problems of proof, especially the proof of intent. In Park
& Tilford the court held that a voluntary conversion of preferred stock to
common stock was a purchase within the terms of the statute. Seizing upon the
definition of "purchase" as "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire"
stock, the court found that an option to convert from preferred to common
stock came within the proscription of the Act. Liability for the profits realized
attached without consideration of subjective elements, since such consideration
was expressly forbidden in Smolowe. Again, no concern was demonstrated for
any point of reference other than definite criteria found within the statute.
Park & Tilford adopted the objective application of the statute and applied
it to cause the relinquishing of all possible profits by the trader, supposedly
giving the statute deterrent value."
The decisions following the reasoning of Smolowe and Park & Tilford all
adhere to the objective standard." The main characteristic of this standard is a
decision whether the transaction and its participants fall within the objective
criteria found in section 16(b). Such criteria, for example, include the status
tionship to the issuer ...... 15 U.S.C. S 78p(b) (1970). This preamble has been em-
ployed by the courts to support varying viewpoints. The only agreement of these viewpoints
is that the statute was designed for the prevention of insider speculative abuses. The point
of agreement itself has been put to differing uses. Where some courts have seen this pre-
amble only as a simple statement of purpose, others have taken it as a fiat to allow a most
liberal interpretation of the statute. In the former interpretation there is the adherence to
a strict mechanistic application of the statute. The courts making the latter interpretation
have used the preamble to implement a policy of considering the possibility of abuse with
less emphasis on strict liability. Compare Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cit. 1959),
with Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cit. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965).
12See generally Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trad-
ing, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 45 (1968).
13 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
14 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
"1 136 F.2d at 235.
1615 U.S.C. § 78c(13) (1970).
'1 160 F.2d at 988.
18 See, e.g., Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406
F.2d 260 (2d Cit. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Western Auto Supply Co.
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1965);
Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cit. 1959); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.,
232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d
140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949). But see Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster,
352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965), in which the court accepted the objective approach, but pro-
ceeded to base its decision on a factual consideration through the subjective approach.
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of shareholder, ownership of certain amounts of stock, and the definitions of
"purchase" and "sale." Beyond these considerations there is little concern with
other factors, and none for those which are more subjective in nature."
The Subjective Approach. In 1958, fifteen years after the decision in Smolowe,
judicial thought turned from the objective viewpoint toward a more subjective
approach in the application of section 16(b). Where statutory construction
was required, the courts began to look for possible opportunities for specula-
tive abuse. In Ferraiolo v. Newman the Sixth Circuit set the new standard by
stating: "[Elvery transaction which can be reasonably defined as a purchase
will be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself
to the speculation encompassed by section 16(b)."' This holding was the first
where the court considered all of the facts of the case before deciding whether
section 16(b) applied.2 In many subsequent cases, if the facts indicated a
possibility for the insider to abuse information, liability attached if the trans-
action met the other criteria necessary to invoke regulation under section
16(b). The Second Circuit, in Blau v. Lamb,2 held that a conversion of pre-
ferred stock was not a sale since the facts presented would not allow any spec-
ulative abuse to occur. With an explicit disavowal of the objective approach
and its "crude rule of thumb" language," a precedent was established which
would resolve previous ambiguities encountered in the application of the
terms "purchase" and "sale" to the various transactions.'
The subjective approach departs from the objective trend of interpretation
by considering the possibility of speculative abuse in the transaction as shown
by the facts of the case. The factual circumstances must be such that the trans-
action presents the opportunity for speculative abuse to the insider. Such
transactions are the concern of section 16(b) as stated in the statutory pre-
"There is behind this view the reasoning that the objective approach is within the pur-
view of the congressional intent since the Congress provided points of mitigation through
the limitation of action by the six-month rule and the administrative power to exempt.
Therefore, the reasoning continues, strict liability should be the standard. All transactions
possibly within the scope of the statute (which is to be read literally) will be regulated re-
gardless of whether there is actual abuse or not.
20259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1958).
2'Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cit. 1971) (exchange of
stock did not provide opportunity for speculative abuse); Bershad v. McDonough, 428
F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970) (option granted provided speculative opportunity); Newmark
v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970) (con-
tract rights to stock provided speculative opportunity); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528
(8th Cit. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967) (economic equivalence of stock al-
lowed no chance for speculative abuse); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cit. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967) (classes of stock economically equivalent-no specula-
tive abuse possible); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 892 (1965) (long term investment--conversion allowed no speculative advantage);
Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cit. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965)
(date of purchase decided on basis of possible gain of speculative advantage); Roberts v.
Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954) (reclassified stock pro-
vided no speculative opportunity).
22363 F.2d 507 (2d Cit. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
21 Id. at 518. The court argued that Congress would have the automatic application of
16(b) negated where the reason for the statute ceased to operate. Id. at 519.
24For a discussion of the complexities of purchase and sale, see Comment, Short Swing
"Purchase and Sales" Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 448 (1966);
Comment, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act,
59 YALE L.J. 510 (1950).
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amble. Considering this stated statutory purpose, the courts have applied the
test in Ferraiolo to penalize those transactions which give rise to the possi-
bility of speculative abuse, while not attaching liability to transactions out
of the supposed scope of the statute.'
II. RELIANCE ELECTRIC CO. v. EMERSON ELECTRIC CO.
In Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co." the Supreme Court of the
United States encountered a case of first impression. In a four-to-three decision,
the Court approved a plan whereby beneficial owners of more than ten percent
of a class of stock could minimize liability under 16(b) by splitting the sale
of stock. In so doing, the cases espousing the subjective approach were ignored,
while the objective standard was recognized as applicable in section 16(b)
cases. The Court found that congressional intent was to promulgate "a flat
rule taking profits out of a class of transactions in which the possibility of
abuse was believed to be intolerably great.""1 Such a rule was taken as a
mandate for the application of the objective standards inherent within the
wording of the statute. This application would optimize the prophylactic
effect of the rule, although the Court recognized that not all abusive trans-
actions were within the purview of the statute.
The Court spoke pointedly of its refusal to impose liability simply because
the insider had acted with the intent to avoid all possible liability.' Instead, the
objective standards of section 16(b) were found controlling. The factual
circumstances of the case were measured against these standards to ascertain
whether there was to be liability for the profits realized. It was held that the
objective standards included the requirement that a ten percent owner be such
"both at the time of the purchase and sale ... of the security involved."" At
the time of the second sale, Emerson was no longer the owner of more than
ten percent of Dodge common stock. Therefore section 16(b) did not en-
compass the second sale." As a consequence of the literal reading of the
statute by the Court, no consideration was given to any possible inconsistency
" See, e.g., 363 F.2d at 515. Is this, in fact, a more flexible approach, or is it also an
automatic application? The word "flexible" is applied to the subjective approach in recog-
nition of the ability of the courts to use this test to exclude some of those shareholders who
could not possibly have abused information to which they had access. Their profits are ex-
empted without the need for consideration of the proof problems sought to be avoided.
Therefore, the shareholder is allowed to retain profits honestly realized, and the number of
harsh impositions of liability where no abuse occurred is reduced.
*404 U.S. 418 (1972).
7 /d. at 422.
28 Cf. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), in which the Court states that ar-
ranging business affairs so as to minimize income tax liability is a legitimate activity. This
line of thought continues in Reliance Electric.
2115 U.S.C. S 78p(b) (1970); see note 4 supra.
" Commentators have previously suggested the plan of sale here used by Emerson as a
method for avoiding the liability encountered by the more-than-10% shareholder under 5
16(b). See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1060 (2d ed. 1961); Seligman, Prohlens
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1934). Loss later commented
upon the consistency of such a plan with the spirit of § 16(b). He suggested the appor-
tionment of the profits from the second sale, with the larger portion of the profits inuring
to the issuer. This would avoid putting a premium on a split sale, as in Reliance Electric,
by the allowance of the profits on the second sale without consideration of the overall trans-
action. 5 L. LOSS, supra, at 3023 (Supp. 2d ed. 1969).
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between the objective standard and the purpose of section 16(b)." Indeed, the
purpose of preventing the unfair use of inside information drew little attention
from the Court.
The Court admitted that there were possible instances when alternative
constructions of the language of the statute were possible. However, it rea-
soned that any construction "that treats two sales as one upon proof of a pre-
existing intent by the seller" is violative of the congressional intent to predicate
liability on an objective measure."2 To allow any alternative would be to violate
the clear directive of the rule that there be no consideration of intent, as well as
allowing a reading of the statute that "flatly contradicts the words of the
statute.""3
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing in dissent, argued that the Court's adherence
to the objective approach ignored the statutory purpose. The assumption that
two sales were two transactions where there "would ordinarily be a single
transaction"' was said to force the holding outside the bounds of the
"broad remedial purpose of the statute,"' thereby undermining its prophylactic
effect. The dissent contended that the transaction must be defined within the
bounds of reason and with the prospect of embracing all transactions which
might present the possibility for speculation. It was noted that one case (in
the subjective trend) had considered multiple purchases to be a single trans-
action.' Such, the dissenters determined, should have been the finding in Re-
liance Electric. Problems of proof created by the abandonment of the objective
standard were argued to be subsidiary to the avowed purpose of the statute."'
In Reliance Electric, it was reasoned, the test applied should have been based
on "a rebuttable presumption that any such series of dispositive transactions
will be deemed to be part of a single plan of disposition, and will be treated
as a single 'sale' . . . .... Would such a test raise those questions of intent
section 16(b) hopes to avoid? The dissent answered that questions of intent
would be factual and would involve only an objective analysis of the dispositive
factors of the transactions made by the insider. The application of such an
analysis could be used to strip insiders of the potentially substantial profits
possible from a plan such as the one Emerson employed. The dissent reasoned:
"Only if a beneficial owner carried an affirmative burden of proof-that his
series of dispositive transactions were not of a type that afforded him an op-
portunity for speculative abuse of his position as an insider-should we say
he was not such a beneficial owner 'at the time of ... sale.' "
The Court's decision in Reliance Electric was an affirmation of the objective
approach as the standard of applicability for section 16(b). With this affirma-
tion the value of some of those decisions employing the subjective approach
1404 U.S. at 424.
32 1d. at 425.
Id. at 427.
MId. at 431.
s Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cit. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1036 (1970).
1404 U.S. at 434, citing Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
" 404 U.S. at 437.
38 Id. at 438.39Id. at 440.
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has been destroyed, although others may still stand as precedent." The Court
has said that there are objective standards within section 16(b) which are
to be used in the determination of liability for profits under the section.4' Con-
sequently, courts hearing questions under section 16 (b) in the future will have
the task of extracting from the statute those standards which they determine to
be objective and applying them to the factual circumstances presented in the
case." The Court has made the task of extraction difficult by failing to define
those objective standards contained in the statute. However, with a clear dis-
missal of the argument that the two sales of Emerson were one transaction, the
Court makes the suggestion that the definition of "purchase" and "sale" are to
be narrowly construed.' Where there are objective standards, there may no
longer be divergent results when the facts present transactions carried out in
the same form.44 The question of inherent possibility for abuse will no longer
be allowed where application of an objective standard is possible. This will
destroy the opportunity for any judicial interpretation other than that of
defining the objective standards necessary to the decision. The courts are now
4 0 See, e.g., Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cit. 1958), which should no longer
have precedential value since it employs a subjective standard to reach a decision as to
whether a stock conversion constitutes a purchase. In Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160
F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), with its objective standard, there is a situation analogous to that
in Ferraiolo.
4' The courts have shown no reluctance to distinguish such a holding. Many of the de-
cisions concerning the problem of whether there is a sale or purchase involved in a conver-
sion have neatly avoided the reasoning in Park & Tilford by stating that the decision was
justified by the facts. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), also a Supreme Court deci-
sion, has been avoided by lower courts. Although it appears to adopt the objective view-
point, it does not have a strong precedential value because the adoption of the viewpoint is
not explicit.
When considering the practical possibilities presented by Reliance Electric, there are
several variables that may come into the plan for minimizing liability. Take for instance
the holder of 101 shares of the outstanding 1,000 shares of a corporation. If he sold 1 share
of this stock in one sale and then in another separate sale sold the remaining 100 shares,
he would be liable only for the profits made in the first sale. However, to separate the two
sales there must be some consideration of the time element, and of the parties to whom the
sales are made. How much time is enough to separate the two? Seemingly, if there are sales
to two different parties, two weeks would suffice to separate the sales. With such separation
there would be no liability for the second sale. The intent of the party to divest himself of
all of his holdings would not be a point of concern as long as it was not extended into
contractual arrangements for the sale of the whole. If a contract for sale of the total holdings
arises, the time element would not enter into consideration. It is important that contractual
obligations for the sale of the whole at a single time, or in a small span of time, or to a
single party be avoided. It is probable that, when such a contractual relationship is discov-
ered, the courts will find a single sale, even though the second sale might be to a different
party.
42404 U.S. at 425. Other terms or clauses within the statute which may be considered
objective standards are "equity security," "director or officer," "more than 10% beneficial
owner," and "issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Also encompassed may be those de-
lineations of when the shareholder must have a certain status for liability to attach. See
Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cit. 1959).
"Compare Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd per curiam
sub -nom. Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950), with Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172
F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949). In these cases the question consid-
ered by the courts was whether rights to acquire stock through the medium of the stock
option constituted a purchase. In Truncale the rights were received by the officers and direc-
tors of the company so that the rights under the stock options were found to be purchases.
In Shaw where all the stockholders received the stock options, the rights were found to be
purchases only upon their exercise. It has been suggested that these cases were the pre-
cursors of the Ferraiolo-subjective approach with the factual circumstance and the possibility
for abuse being the basis of the disparate views. See also Comment, Short Swing "Purchase
and Sales" Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 448, 465 (1966).
faced with testing each case for points of application of the objective standards
of section 16(b). The test implicit in Reliance Electric consists of two parts:
(1) whether there is an explicit objective standard within the statute which
can define all components of the transaction and define the status of the
participants in the transaction; and (2) if not, whether there was the possi-
bility for abuse within the factual situation presented by the case. With an
affirmative answer to the first question, the second is necessarily ignored under
the holding in Reliance Electric. The cases suggested by the Court as examples
of alternative constructions lead to the conclusion that the Court would allow
the application of the subjective approach in some instances.' However, Re-
liance Electric serves as a limit on application of the subjective standard. The
facts presented by the case must not be susceptible of any clear application of
those definite criteria contained in section 16(b) if the subjective approach
is to be used. This necessarily narrows the wide application of the subjective
approach made before Reliance Electric. As the courts hear more cases involv-
ing section 16(b), and the objective standards of which the Court spoke
become more clearly defined, there will be, in all likelihood, an even more
automatic approach to attachment of section 16(b) liability.
III. CONCLUSION
The objective approach chosen by the Court as the standard of application
for section 16(b) would appear to allow the most exact application of section
16(b). It is this literal and exact application which makes the statute in-
applicable in Reliance Electric. It would seem, however, that the decision is
regressive inasmuch as it avoids a class of cases where the subjective standard
might be better applied. In avoiding the subjective approach the Court ignores
such considerations as the "sequence of relevant transactions"" which might
enable an interpretation of the statute to be more in keeping with the stated
purpose of section 16(b). With the use of the subjective standard there could
be avoided those applications of the section which are harsh." To make use
of this standard the courts will probably have to resort to the technique used
in skirting the precedent in Park & Tilford-that of distinguishing the case
on the facts. However, this technique will only be available to the courts in
a narrow area of section 16(b) cases. If there is to be avoidance of the harsh
result and a more efficient capture of those profits taken in transactions where
inside information is used, it would seem that congressional amendment of
' 404 U.S. at 424 n.4. The Court has recognized that the objective standards present
within the statute are not completely dispositive of all questions raised by situations con-
cerning 5 16(b). Some alternative constructions are possible. The Court sets out spe-
cific examples of such situations. Ironically, several cases cited as examples are said by most
courts and commentators to be decided through the objective approach. See note 18 supra,
and accompanying text. Other decisions mentioned are in the subjective trend. The Court
says: "The various tests employed in these cases are used to determine whether a transaction,
objectively defined, falls within or without the terms of the statute." 404 U.S. at 424 n.4 .
Could it be that those terms of which the Court speaks encompass the legislative purpose of
preventing speculative abuse? See, e.g., Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.
1970).
46404 U.S. at 432, quoting Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970).
"
7Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965).
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